CIA ON HAJ AMIN AL-HUSSEINI – 1943
Nov 12,1943
SECRET
HAJJ AMIN EL HUSSEINI GRAND'NUFTI OF JERUSALEM
Sean against the background of recent Palestine history
HADJ AMIN EL HUSSEINI, GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM.
A history and criticism.
Introduction.
This is a dictation, partly in flawless English and partly in the richer Arabic (when the subject seemed of paramount importance) and translated. The informant is a native Arab Moslem of Jerusalem – one of the best brains and best educated – and while his name has been associated with those of the "Arab leaders" since the British Occupation, he is known to the present writer as moderate and sane.
No responsibility is taken for the views herein divulged, but special notes have been added under the heading "Editor's Notes".
Family Tree and Education.
Hadj Amin was born in Jerusalem in 1894 or 5. At the time his father, Tahir el Hasseini, had held this poet as the Moslem Religious Head of Jerusalem.
(Editor's note: The Husseini family is descended from Hussein, the son of Fatma, the daughter of Muhammad, and therefore has no peers in Arab genealogy. Tahir was a sedate, kindly old man, very much loved by all Moslems, and highly respected by Christian Arabs, foreigners, etc. Upon his death, at a mature age during the Turkish regime, his eldest son, Kamil Effendi, succeeded him to the honored position of Mufti. Kamil Effendi, like his father, was the embodiment of what would be expected of a religious leader.

He was upright, well educated in Koranic law, a polished Arab gentleman of his time, besides having a little knowledge of French, and modern enough to have a considerable amount of general knowledge. In this latter he was more advanced than his late father.)

Upon Kamil Effendi's untimely death in 1921, his brother by another mother, Hadj Amin became Grand Mufti, a title created and coined by the British for even in the present-day Moslem law there is no such post as Grand, all are Mufti. Although Hadj Amin belonged to the family that long had held the office of Mufti of Jerusalem, the post is not hereditary but subject to the vote of an electoral college of Ulama.

Hadj Amin was educated in the then Turkish Government School of Palestine and later graduated from the El Azhar, the world renowned Moslem ecclesiastical school of Cairo. He spoke a little French and learned some English after the British Occupation, but spoke it scarcely well enough to carry on an important conversation. He could read and write both these languages, but haltingly. His Arabic and Turkish were beyond reproach. While still only a youth he accompanied his mother on a pilgrimage to Mecca and thus came by the title of "Hadj" very early in life, a distinction neither his father nor brother before him earned.

Hadj Amin returned to Palestine from El Azhar in 1914 and was drafted into the Turkish army, becoming an infantry officer, and was posted to Turkey where he saw some fighting. He was on leave in Palestine when it was first occupied by the British. He deserted, hid, and thus remained in Palestine to the end of World War I.

Start in Life.

Although educated as a religious leader, Hadj Amin seemed to have a flare for politics from his youth. In 1917 he espoused the cause of the Arab leader, Sharif Feisal. In the first few months he recruited some 1500 Palestine Arabs

whom he sent to join the Lawrence Arab army.

In 1918 the British army set up an 0.E.T.A. North (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) with Emir Feisal administrating. He later became King of Syria (July 1920), with headquarters in Damascus.

At this time Hadj Amin (although he was yet young and lacked his later acquired poise and dignity, Ed.) was very active in Damascus, espousing the cause of the general Arab movement and was there regarded as Palestine's delegate to the same. In Palestine he was looked upon as the spokesman of the Arab Union.

The aims of this body were to implement the 1915 promises made by Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein in the name of the British Government as the Arabs understood them. They aimed at unifying "Greater Syria", i.e. present Syria, Lebanon, TransJordan and Palestine, and to oppose Zionism and to enter into a treaty with Great Britain and her allies.

(Editor's note: During the Turkish regime south Palestine was an independent sanjak coming directly under Constantinople, while north Palestine was a sanjak administered at different times by various Syrian vilayets. Trans-Jordan was another sanjak under Damascus. At the time there was no road connection from Jerusalem to Trans-Jordan, and the Jordan chasm formed a formidable barrier, while the then new Mecca railroad facilitated the administration of Trans-Jordan from south Syria. Hence in the Sykes-Pecot agreement Trans-Jordan was included in the French Mandate of Syria.) LINK

(Editor's note: The relator's history here jumps over a period of blank. Little of it is generally known only that after the self-imposed exile both the condemned were forgiven and allowed to return as normal citizens to Palestine, one to soon become "Grand Mufti of Palestine", the other to rise to the post of Assistant District Commissioner of the Beersheba District, and the first to

carry out a census of the roving Bedu tribes. Aref el Aref is now District Officer of Ramalla, Jerusalem subdistrict, a position as high as is now attainable by a non-Britisher,

As the present writer was fully acquainted with the facts of the case, the story of this historical gap is now filled in. Upon an agreement between Great Britain and France, TransJordan was changed to the British Mandate, and to make a show of getting the consent of the subjects, the first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, having but recently arrived in Palestine, traveled to Es-Salt to officially take take over the territory. Invited by His Excellency to join his party was a news correspondent, fluent in the Arabic language and with an extensive knowledge of Arab customs, not the least of these being Bedouin lore and justice. Let us call him “X”.

On his arrival at Es-Salt the paramount Sheikhs waited upon the High Commissioner and were asked in substance: “Would you prefer to change to British rule or remain under French Mandate?” The pro-British feeling was too well known to need inquiry.

These chiefs hurried to “X” to pour out their grief. They said in short,”the British armies entered our country and we fought for them; they were forced to retreat and the Turks hanged many of us as traitors. The British army a second time took our city (Es-Salt) and again we fought the Turks, and when a second time they were forced to retreat, we had to migrate to Palestine and our homes and property were plundered. Now you ask if we want Britain. What guarantee have we that the British will not again desert us and that the French will not punish us for declaring in favor of Britain?”

X imparted the above Arab feeling to Sir Herbert, and the next day in his speech, when officially taking over TransJordan, he said in effect – “as you have chosen to come under the rule of Great Britain” etc.

But to return. The evening before the final taking over of the territory at a public function in the town square, “X”, along with the less important members of the party, was being served with a super Arab dinner by a rich Christian family they were billeted with. His Excellency and his immediate staff were guests of another notable. In strode a young British officer, much excited: “Hadj Amin and Aref el Aref are in town. Strap on your side arms and lets go and get them” he shouted. “They are criminals and have flown from justices” “X” replied, Link

The result was that the officers did not pursue their raid, and X immediately reported the incident to Sir Herbert and explained the Bedu viewpoint. His Excellency made no remarks at the time. The next morning, respondent in diplomatic uniform, and bedecked with medals, Sir Herbert stood on a dais preparatory to making his statement. A row of paramount chiefs walked up abreast, arms crossed, hands clasped, to the dais. In unison they said in effect, “Before Your Excellency speaks we ask one favour – the pardoning of Hadj Amin and Aref el Aref.” Sir Herbert replied, “They have already been pardoned. They may return to Palestine.” Before many minutes, Aref el Aref, who was on the fringe of the crowd, was being borne on the shoulders of the Arab youths. Some time after his return from TransJordan and and during the fatal illness of his brother, Hadj Amin donned the robes of the Moslem Ulama.)

On the death of Kamil Effendi in 1921, the British Palestine Government took steps toward the election of a new Mufti. The electoral college is the “Ulama” (i.e. Moslem priests wise in Koranic law). In this election Hadj Amin lost, the three highest votes falling to Sheikh Khalil Khaldi, Sheikh Musa Budeiri and Sheikh Hussam ed Din Jarallah. Of these the Government had the right to appoint as Mufti its choice, regardless of size of vote. Hadj Amin had pulled the fourth vote and was therefore out. It was common knowledge that the Government was backing Hadj Amin, as it realized that the Moslems at large favored him, a feeling not shared by the electoral college. Government

therefore induced one of the contestants to withdraw, thus bringing Hadj Amin into line, and he was duly declared Multi.

Creation of the Supreme Muslim Council

(Editor's notes: Under the Turks, then a Moslem government, the "Awqaf" (entailed property) and the "Sharia Courts" (religious courts) were two of the regular official departments of government, each headed by a Cabinet Minister in Constantinople, the latter with the added title of "Sheikh el Islam". The first British Government Military Administration, the 0.E.T.A., was forced to appoint a Christian to head Moslem religious institutions. This curious state of affairs was carried over into the first Civil Administration.)

Sir Herbert Samuel, who had arrived as the first High Commissioner to Palestine in June, 1921, to allay the feeling of the Moslems, created a scheme whereby the internal affairs of the Moslems in respect of waxes, religious institutions and courts, would be administered by a body elected by Moslems but under Government control. Thus the Supreme Moslem Council came into being, with Hadj Amin as head of it, with the title of Rais el Ulama (Head of the Religious Scholars).

Thus from 1921, when Hadj Amin became Mufti, until 1929, when the third disturbance took place, he abstained from politics, his only efforts along those lines being in the opposition of Zionism as a tangible menace to Moslem religious institutions. (Editor's note: The second most holy site to Islam is El Aksa, the place of Solomon's , Zerubabel's and Herod's Temples. In the latter, Jesus was educated and later taught. About the period of Sir Herbert Samuel's administration and earlier, the Jews, very unwisely, made no secret of their ambition, hope and belief that this area, with the two great Moslem mosques, would be restored to them, and the Hebrew temples rebuilt.) Hadj Amin, both as Grand Mufti and Head of the Moslem Supreme Council, found himself in a very favorable position to champion the opposition to these Jewish aspirations.

At the time there was no little Jewish and Moslem agitation about these holy sites. This conflict later more or less petered out.

In 1930, when the Shaw Report was published, the Arabs happily saw their cause vindicated, and a delegation was sent to London to discuss changes of policy. This was Hadj Amin's first public appearance as a political leader. While the head of the delegation was the revered and aged Musa Kazim Pasha el Husseini, the Mufti was regarded both by Arabs and British as the dominating and moving spirit and figure.

London Arab Delegation.

The result of these discussions was the Passfield White Paper, a decision of Government implementing the recommendations of the Shaw Commission report. Had Government stuck to this report and "White Paper" (curtailment of land sales and immigration, and the setting up of a legislative council) no trouble would have resulted, for at that period less than 150,000 Jews lived in Palestine. These were the old Jewish inhabitants and new immigrants. However, within a few weeks owing to Zionist pressure, these decisions of Government were withdrawn, and the British Government had appointed a committee in London of Jews and British to discuss the findings.

The withdrawal of this "White Paper" took the form of a letter by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to Dr. WAxmann, explaining away all the decisions of the British Government embodied in the White Paper. This document has since been known among the Arabs as the "black letter".

Up to and including this period Musa Kazim Pasha el Housseini was the recognised Arab political leader. (Ed: He always preached moderation and restraint). During these demonstrations and killings at Jaffa, at which he was present and almost lost his life, he got a shock from which he never recovered. He died in 1934 at the age of 85 years. From the time of his death up to 1936

there existed no central organized Arab body. Hearing of these disturbances, Hadj Amin speeded up his return from India. He was presumably at the time already on his way home, and in Iraq. Sir Arthur Wauchope, High Commissioner, also away from Palestine on leave, returned hastily. Hadj Amin had a high esteem for the High Commissioner, which was probably reciprocated. The Mufti went hard to work to stamp out the anti-British feeling that had been brewing, and Sir Arthur aimed at winning back the lost Arab confidence in the British.

Shortly after this the High Commissioner started talks with leading Arabs, with a view to starting a legislative council (composed of Arabs and Jews in proportion to population, dominated by a British vote, Ed.) and finding ways and means for the curtailment of land sales and suppressing immigration.

At the time our present informant held an appointment in the Palestine Government of great confidence, and was therefore in a position to know. Ed.
Musa Kazim Pasha was buried in the Madrasa or Schools bordering the El Aksa enclosure, along with King Hussein of Arabia and Muhammad Ali, the Indian Moslem champion, who died in London daring a conference. These three were the first and only ones to be thus honored for centuries. Ed.

In 1935 a formal offer was made by the Palestine Government, under instructions from London, for the creation of such a council. The Arabs had agreed to the creation of such a council with the High Commissioner’s veto in all matters of imperial policy, but would not agree to immigration and land transfers being subject to this veto.

This offer was bitterly opposed by the Jews both in Palestine and London. In Parliament most cf the speakers were pro-Zionist and against the creation of the council, so much so that under this pressure London withdrew the offer of these constitutional changes. Instead His Majesty’s Government sent an invitation to Arab leaders to visit London, with a view to discussing further

possibilities for Palestine.

The Arabs, who had been very hopeful and happy when these changes were proposed, were equally grieved when their implementation was withdrawn. Thus a belief came into being that the British Government was not to be trusted so long as they allowed themselves to be ruled by Zionism.

This 1935-6 invitation was neither formally accepted nor refused, but it was made quite clear to Government that no useful purpose could be served if the invitation was based upon their present pro-Zionist policy. This Arab policy was also linked with the fact that for the past few years legal Zionist immigration had gone up, and that nothing drastic was done to eliminate illegal Jewish entries into Palestine.

The 1936 Riots.

While the invitation to London was still being considered, the 1936 troubles started. According to the later Peel Report, Arab brigands had held up a bus, resulting in the killing of two Jewish passengers. It was a matter of pure robbery, with no political significance. Within twelve hours, in reprisal, Jews killed some Arabs living in the vicinity of Zionist settlements or among them. The Jews did not try to hide the fact that this was pure revenge. The Arab brigands were known to the police, and while action was being taken against them, owing to the melee that followed, they were not caught. No action was taken to identify and punish the Jewish offenders.

The resulting wrath of the Arabs found vent in mass demonstrations by Jaffa Arabs (who were nearer the scene of the Jewish killing of Arabs, Ed.) and in resolutions being taken by the existing labour organizations and all political parties to call for a general strike in protest not only of the killings by Jews, but also the non-action of Government in bringing the culprits to justice.

Beginnings of the Arab Higher Committee.

The strike started upon the day appointed (April 26) and was completed. Within a few days Arab labour political parties and youth organizations, up till now working independently, decided that there should be created a central body to direct the political movements and to supervise the then existing strike. All these bodies, including his political opponents, unanimously asked Hadj Amin to preside. Hence the creation of the Arab Higher Committee.

The Arab Higher Committee.

This Committee was composed of Jamal Housseini, President, Palestine Arab Party, Jerusalem, Rageb Nashashibi, Defence Party, Dr. Hussein Khaldi, President, Reform Party, Yacoub Ghussein, Youth Party, Jaffa, Amin Abdka Abdul Hadi, Istaklal (Independence Party), Abd el Latif Salah, President National Block, (Editor's note: Musa Kazim Pasha had a comparatively weak personality but through his impartiality unified the Arabs and got them to unanimously rally around their cause. Hadj Amin, though a much abler man with a good brain, could not detach himself from being partisan.)

The beginning of Hadj Amin's Political Life.

The first few months of the strike were peaceful, but it should be remembered that since 1933 a definite anti-British feeling had been growing. The prime factor behind this feeling was the Istaklal, that based its programme on this policy. In fact since 1933 the Mufti had been branded by those of the Independent Party and other extremists as a British "satellite", employee and "spy".

There is no doubt in my mind and I have reason to believe that until 1935 at least Hadj Amin was pro-British. By pro-British I mean that he wished to solve the Arab problems in cooperation with the British, at the same time being deadly anti-Zionist, and nothing could stop his hatred of Zionism. I would go further and state that it was Istaklal propaganda and the efforts of this body that forced his hands, so that bit by bit he finally became definitely anti-

British.

From April to June, 1936, the strike was peaceful. All transportation was stopped; stores and shops were closed; the strike worked very effectually for these first two months, when it should have been called off. Instead, the strike disintegrated into a rebellion against the British, and tilts was side-tracked from the fight against Zionism.

The cause of the 1936 Rebellion.

The start of war with Britain.

This 1936 rebellion had its birth when the Palestine Government tried to force-ably end the strike by (a) protecting convoys; (b) force-ably compelling Arabs to open their stores and shops. Towards this end Police Inspector Sigrist was daily sent into the Arab section of Old Jerusalem with squads of British police to beat up those AC° refused to open up their shops or go back to work. (Signet was wounded and an assistant killed). Heretofore Arabs, in attacking Jews, had been cautioned lest inadvertently they should wound a Britisher. Now the attacking of British was legitimized. As before said, the strike should have been called off before these developments. The effect upon world sympathy would undoubtedly have been better.

The strike, having then developed into a rebellion, by August the rebellion developed into open warfare, particularly so when Iraqi army officers resigned their commissions and came to Palestine to participate in the war. The leader of these Iraqi regulars was Fawzi Kawoukji.

Calling off the war of rebellion, and its lessons.

This war of rebellion came to an end by the Arab Higher Committee calling it off. They and the Arab public however, came to the following conclusions in the light of their experiences.

A. It was more effective to fight the British than the Zionists directly, because

it was the British backing that had created Jewish arrogance and exaggerated demands.

B. An army finds it can do little to suppress or harm rebels or bands.

C. Air warfare is ineffective against grilles. (The Arabs shot down scores of war planes, four in one engagement).

Therefore, when the rebellion ended in 1936 it left the Arabs dead against British policy.

The Royal Commission.

Just before this first rebellion ended the London Government announced that a Royal Commission would proceed to Palestine as soon as quiet was restored to investigate into the reasons for the current disturbances, and to recommend a solution. The Peel Commission arrived in Palestine in the autumn, and the first reaction of the Arabs was to boycott it. I believe the major Arab reasons for the boycott were prompted by the terms of reference under which this Commission was to proceed, i.e. that its recommendations were to be based on the promises embodied in the Balfour Declaration and not, as the Arabs wished, on the existing circumstances in the country, thus laying the door open to further Zionist immigration.

It was but a week before the date fixed for the departure of this Royal Commission that, through the intervention of neighboring Arab states, the Arabs agreed to present their case.

- Between 1936 and 1941, after returning to Iraq, where he did not even rejoin the regular army, he was on friendly terms with many British officers whom he had fought against and who considered him a good soldier and a gentleman. In 1941 he helped fight the British in Iraq as a gorilla, and again in Syria. When Syria was invaded he was wounded and with his son was flown to Germany,

where the latter died, while he was in a serious condition for months.

- The rebellion was costly to Britain. Not only did it spend huge sums during the two months, but it also was forced to bring to Palestine many troops thereby, stopping military maneuvers in England. Not the least of Britain’s embarrassments was the explaining and vindicating of its position to the League of Nations.

The principal witness was Hadj Amin, and in his testimony he put forward the Arab case in a new light:

A. That Arabs had always been friendly to Great Britain; had fought as her allies in the World War; had obtained promises for the independence of all Arab countries, including Palestine.

B. That the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had been made without Arab knowledge or consent, and was diametrically opposed to promises made in 1915 for their independence. Above all, this declaration was contrary to natural justice. It meant bringing into the country a people totally alien to the existing population in race, religion, outlook on life. This influx meant robbing the Arabs of their home. It jeopardized the economic and political status of the long existing population. Again he showed that this forcing of Zionism upon Palestine was a unique chapter in history, where immigrants were forced into a country against its wishes, and by the bayonets of a great and strong nation.

C. That the rebellion was not against Britain, as British, but against their espousing Zionist greed.

D. That Palestine demanded that the promises of independence given by Britain should be fulfilled, and that When this was done Palestine would enter into treaty relations with Great Britain to safeguard, not only her interests, but those of her allies and friends. That the necessary constitutional and other machinery should be created for the protection of all religious interests in

Palestine. And particularly:

1. That the Jews who were in Palestine before the British Occupation would have absolutely equal rights with the Arabs of Palestine; and

2. That those Jews who had come in under Zionist invasion would have their civil and religious rights protected, but no political rights.

Hadj Amin voices independence.

Thus, for the first time, a voice for complete independence was raised by a Palestine Arab political leader. There were two causes behind this seeking for independence:

A. It was but a natural evolution for small nations who had long been oppressed to seek independence after the first World War, and many obtained it along President Wilson’s self-determination principles. The urge was accentuated as well, by British promises to the Arabs.

eeee(The general belief that the present-day inhabitants of Palestine are Arabs, and therefore foreign to it, is erroneous. Palestinians of Arab descent are but few. Most Palestinians are descendants of the early Canaanite families and lived here long before the Israelitish invasion. .ed.

B. They believed, after nearly twenty years experience of British rule, that a definite Zionist programme had shown them that nothing short of complete independence could save Palestine from being flooded by Jews and becoming a Zionist state.

The reason for this insistence upon independence was the Arabs’ complete lack of confidence in British investigation of their grievances and their pledges,# notably to control immigration and land sales. They believed that Zionist influence in London was supreme. It could be stated in truth that the majority of Arabs would have welcomed British rule, with a share of internal administration and determination, had it not been for the Balfour Declaration

and the pushing of its unnatural policy.

CHAPTER II.

The Palestine Riots and their Causes.

I cannot explain the reasons for the state of mind that started these riots without going back. The Balfour Declaration was made in 1917 and was kept secret at first. After Palestine was taken by Lord Allenby, the Turks and the Germans, while still not driven out of Syria, used the Balfour Declaration as anti-British propaganda, but was not believed by the Arabs who were then firmly pro-British. At the time Jerusalem was taken I was in the Turkish censor’s office in Damascus, but later joined my father in Constantinople where he held an important civil appointment representing Arab interests.

While I was in Constantinople, Germany was at the time helping Turkey resist Lord Allenby’s advance further into Palestine and Syria. Tallat Pasha, the then Grand Vizier, told my father that Britain had sold Palestine to the Jews. My father expressed his disbelief to me in unmistakable language.

While still in Constantinople a member of the German Embassy called upon my father and other Palestinian leaders and informed them of the then secret Balfour Declaration. All these Arabs looked upon this statement only as German propaganda. In January, 1919, my father and I returned to Jerusalem, and soon after the American Crane-King Commission came to Syria, and was to have come to Palestine but did not.

It will be recalled that President Wilson, pursuant to his policy of self-determination, suggested an allied commission to find out the wishes of every country as to what kind of Government it desired. Britain and France withdrew, but the United States insisted upon their Commission pursuing its findings. At the time both British and French were actively engaged in propaganda against each other in preparation for the Commission’s coming.

eee Editor: At this juncture, in order to clarify the Arab attitude toward these riots, their background, causes, then ensuing investigations and recommendations by Government, etc., our informant was asked to give a list of these riots and their consequences.

In this very room Picot, of Sykes-Picot fame, and the Consul-General of France called upon my father and warned him that the British had promised Palestine to Zionism; that France was staunch Catholic and would not let the land of Jesus go to those who crucified him. He concluded by saying that true France and Britain were allies and friends; that he was simply giving information, and it was for the Arabs to choose, etc. I recall when Picot left, my father said to me (I had been translating), “God annihilate them – they lied, Britain would never do such a dirty trick.”

At this time Colonel Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, and others called upon my father, and likewise tried to prepare us for the Crane-King Commission. (I remember Storrs was sitting in that corner). He reminded us that Great Britain was the greatest Moslem power, and it therefore was inconceivable for them to do anything that would harm the Arabs for the benefit of the Jews.

I Was then but a youth and preparing to go to college in England, and to that end often called on Colonel Storrs solely for advice and help in this matter. Quite voluntarily and seemingly uncalled for, he warned me about not believing false propaganda – the Balfour Declaration was only a war measure and meant nothing.

Again, in Palestine, my father had made the acquaintance of a very rich English Jew, the ex-Mayor of …….When I left Jerusalem to go to college in England, my father sent him a present by me, and I was invited to spend a week-end at his home. This was on the eve of the San Remo conference, April 25th, 1920, when Britain’s allies for the first time supported the Balfour

pledge, and gave the Mandate of Palestine to Great Britain. Mr. —- was very agitated about the outcome of the conference and depressed. I till then was so ignorant of the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration, and so fully believed what we had heard about it was pure:propaganda, that I did not understand this gentleman's emotions. I said to him that Arabs and Jews had always lived together in peace, and that the Jews had nothing to fear from the Arabs. He replied, "No Mr.—–, this time i is quite different. We wish to go to Palestine to rule. We have been ruled long enough, and now we will rule." In truth, this was the first time I got it into my head that the Zionist menace was a fact, not propaganda of the enemies of Great Britain.

Besides, after the British Occupation, and especially since 1918, the arrogance of the Jews was marked. They jostled Arabs on the streets and often told us that for these past generations we had been watchmen of their country; now we were no longer needed and could clear out. (Ed: see Palestine Royal Commission Report, 1937, p. 52).

Added to this, leading English Jews and allied statesmen were issuing Zionist pronouncements that disturbed Arab thought. One of the most noticeable was that of Sir Alfred Monde later Lord Melchet, to the effect that he was an architect and that he hoped to see, in his life-time, the Hebrew Temple rebuilt upon the site of the El Aqsa Mosque.

Sir Herbert Samuel, before he became High Commissioner, similarly made remarks very painful to the iambs, but after coming to Palestine and holding this important post, learned to tone down his statements.

Along with these greater personalities, lesser British Jews uttered published statements that riled the Arabs. In this connection in 1918 (?), Governor Storrs invited all the Arab leaders, Moslem and Christian, to his office. There they met Dr. Weizman, who said that he wished to inform them that Zionism was an accomplished fact, and he advised them that it was useless for them to resist;

that the Jews were coming to Palestine and that all the powers were behind them, etc.

The Arabs were taken aback, and asked Storrs if they had been invited to be insulted, and withdrew from his office without making any answer.

The 1920 Jerusalem Riots.

To return then to the list of disturbances, their causes and action thereon.

On Sunday, when the Hebronite procession entered Jerusalem for the Nebi Mousa festivity and procession to “Moses’ tomb”, while the flags were still outside the Jaffa Gate (called the Hebron Gate by the Arabs Ed.) speeches were made by various Arabs, the most outstanding by Hadj Amin, not yet Mufti, and Aref el Aref (see pp. 2 and 3). The gist of these statements was that under the auspices of the Allied Nations an Arab State had been created in Syria, with Damascus as its capital and Emir Feisal at its head. This in fulfillment of Allied pledges to the Arabs through King Hussein. Palestine should then, in fulfillment of the same pledges, come into that state. Palestinians must look to Faisal as their future king.

At the moment when the crowds were in this high state of elation and emotion, a Jew spat on one of the sacred banners. This was sufficient to infuriate the crowd, who at once attacked Jewish shops and attacked individuals, killing and wounding some. The military and police had to interfere to stop the trouble. Some Arabs were also killed and wounded.

Palestine was then under military administration, and a commission to enquire into these troubles was appointed.

The Palin-McBarnett Commission.

Their Commission enquired by hearing the evidence in secret of Arabs, Jews, British and others, and reported to the military authorities, which report was never published. It was, however, referred to by later commissions and in the

British House of Commons, so that something is known of its contents and that it clearly stated the Arab point of view, their fear and antagonism to Zionism, and at the same time putting on record the various pronouncements of Zionist leaders and British statesmen regarding the arms of Zionism which had inflamed the nations. It particularly referred to the demeanor and arrogance of the Jews toward the Arabs of Palestine.

Although the report was not published, it was hoped and believed by the Arabs that through it their lot would be improved.

APPOINTMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

A shock to this belief came within a few weeks (July 1, 1920) when a Civil Government took over, headed by Sir Herbert Samuel, a Jew who had already committed himself openly to Zionism, with a large number of Jews in key positions, among them M. Norman Hentwich as Legal Adviser, later called Attorney-General, who had already written a pro-Zionist book on Palestine. The facts that later Sir Herbert and Mr. Bentwich, etc., while still holding their love for Zionism, proved to be gentlemen and did not misuse their posts, and that in time the Arabs learned to love and respect Sir Herbert, did not alter the feeling of shock that went over the Arabs when the new government was announced and came into being.

The May, 1921 Outbreak.

This disturbance started in Jaffa and spread to Tulkarm district. The true cause has never been clarified’. However, according to the Peele Report (page 51) the following appears:

“In May, 1921, there was another alarming outbreak. Excited by disturbances arising from an internal Jewish quarrel between the Bolshevik group and the Orthodox Labour Party, the Arabs of Jaffa made a murderous attack on the Jewish inhabitants of the town; and on subsequent days destructive Arab raids

were made on five of the Jewish rural colonies.”

The report of the inquiry into these events conducted by Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, and two officials, revealed to the public for the first time the strength of the Arab antagonism and the reasons for it. “The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots”, wrote the Commission, “was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with and hostility to the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy, as derived from Jewish exponents.’ The Jews tried to explain this as the work of the discontented effendi class. However, the Haycraft report answers this as follows: “The feeling against the Jews was too genuine, too wide spread, and too intense to be accounted for in the above superficial manner.”

These disturbances resulted in a statement of policy of His Majesty’s Government in a “White Paper”, generally known as the Churchill “White Paper, 1922”. In it the principal item was the interpretation of His Majesty’s Government’s conception of the “National Home” that was promised to the Jews. His Majesty’s Government said that what was intended was a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, and not Palestine to be a National Home for the Jews.

This, along with suggestions for constitutional and administrative institutions in which Arabs would have their say, allayed somewhat the fear of the Arabs, – fear of the transforming of their whole homeland into a Jewish State,-and would have been a good basis for an understanding between the three parties concerned, but unfortunately, from 1922 to 1926, the Jews carried on their previous policy of intensive immigration and the development of “their home” independently of Arab economic conditions, and against the spirit of the Churchill “White Paper”, for they not only did not try to get Arab cooperation, but punished any Jews who used Arab help or labor in any way.

The 1929 Riots. A period of boom and depression.

To understand the reasons for these we shall go back. From 1920-1926, 100,000 new immigrants had arrived. A great proportion of the large tracts of land were procured in this period, and many Arab villages were liquidated by the sale of land by Syrian absentee landlords. The Jewish economic activities were prospering without, as above said, any co-operation with the Arabs advocated by the White Paper. These we might call Zionist boom years. Proportionally they increased Arab fear and antagonism. From 191?-1929 came a period of Zionist slump. No money from abroad was forthcoming; thus no work could be found for immigrants. Much land lay fallow and many Jews migrated from Palestine. Thus conversely the Arab fear was also temporarily put to sleep.

To revive the Zionist effort two new issues were inaugurated –

A. The religious issue of the Wailing Wall, thus putting a cloak of sanctity upon a political aspiration; and

B. The enlargement of the Jewish Agency and its reinforcement by the Zionists making peace with and adding the non-Zionist Jewish element, a very wealthy body (particularly in America), to its forces.

The Wailing Wall.

(Editor’s note: The lower courses of this wall, built of great drafted stones, are in all probability part of Herod's reconstruction of the Solomon-Zerubabel Hebrew Temples. This temple site lay unused and in ruin most of the time after Titus destroyed Jerusalem. Omar cleared out the debris and his successors built the Dome of the Rock and the El-Aqsa Mosque. The latter name is often used by the Moslems to cover the whole enclosure, which more correctly is named Haram esh-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary). This wall then, is in fact a terrace built to help level off the top of Mount Moriah, raising it above the deep Tyropean Valley. Orthodox Jews, particularly the past generations

feared to tread on the holy site of tneir Temple, so that it became a custom to pray before this ancient wall.)

The El Aqsa enclosing wall, along with the pavement before it, are known to be Moslem Awqaf property, together with some land and buildings hereabouts.

By Turkish Government dispensation the Jews were allowed to come to this wall for their devotions, but never was there any question of their bringing their religious paraphernalia, or to use anything that would give the place the setting of a synagogue. Under the Mandate, under the heading of holy Places or places of worship, the status quo was to be preserved and kept. In September, 1928, on the Day of Atonement, the Jews brought a screen and other synagogue furniture, but since it was an infringement of the status quo, it was at once removed by the British police under authority of the District Commissioner by Government order. From the report of the British Parliamentary Commission that Came to Jerusalem to investigate into the 1929 troubles, the following is quoted: “From that day (Sept. 1928) the Wailing Wall became a symbol of racial pride and ambition, the questions of rights and claims in connection with it ceased to be a religious issue, and a smoldering spark was set to the long fuse that in the following August was to result in conflagration.” (Shaw Commission Report, page 153).

After the incident of September, 1928, Moslem opinion was mobilized by the formation of the Society for the Protection of the Moslem Holy Places, and by the creation of the Jews of the Pro-Wailing Wall Committee. Seeing that the Jews sought to extend their privileges and convert them into their rights and ownership, the Moslems leaned backwards in guarding their status quo and for the sake of future protection, both political and religious.

In November, 1928, another White Paper, commonly known as the Wailing

Wall White Paper, was issued giving the full right of ownership to the Moslems, but maintaining the status quo in regard to the worship of the Jews there. (Ed: See also “Cmd. 3229, The Western or Wailing Wall in Jerusalem: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.”)

This White Paper caused intense dissatisfaction among the Jews, but a corresponding satisfaction to the Arabs.

In June, 1929, Government authorized the Moslems, pursuant to the authority of the White Paper, to continue some building which had been stopped by them awaiting the outcome of the White Paper. The Jews, while not contesting the validity of the order of Government, regarded it as a humiliation. “Expression to these feelings was given in the demonstration held at Tel-Aviv on the 14th of August, and in the Jewish procession to and demonstration at the Wailing Wall on the following day. At the Wall on the-15th of August the Zionist flag was raised, the Zionist anthem was sung and two minutes’ silence was observed, and there were such cries as the Wall is ours ” (Shaw Commission Report, page 154).

A counter demonstration was held by the Moslems the next day. “The chain of circumstances connected with the Wailing Wall is unbroken, from the Day of Atonement, or September, 1928, up to the 23rd or August, 1929, and it must in our view be regarded as a whole. If from this series of events some incident had to be selected as

B.The enlargement. of the Jewish Agency.

I will here quote again from the findings of the Shaw Commission (pages 156 & 157). “We also consider that the enlargement of the Jewish Agency was a factor which contributed to the outbreak – it was common knowledge in Palestine that at Zurich the Zionist movement was likely to be reinforced by a strong body of wealthy non-Zionists, who were expected to provide funds for

the further development of Zionist activities in Palestine. The news that this expectation had been realized would quickly spread, and was in our opinion a cause of increased apprehension and alarm among all classes of Arabs. Thus these two moves on the part of Zionism to counter the slump, likewise awakened the Arabs from their lethargy.

The result of these 1929 riots was that a Parliamentary body, the Shaw Commission, was appointed by the British Government, with the following terms of reference:

A. “To inquire into the immediate causes which lea to the recent outbreak in Palestine; and

B. To make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence.”

The Commission’s findings on A. were principally the Wailing Wall incident, that started a chain of incidents from September, 1928, to August, 1929, and the enlargement of the Jewish Agency, which revived Arab fears, etc. ., etc. (Shaw Commission, page 150).

With regard to B., political recommendations were urged such as, (1) that immediately his Majesty’s Government should publish a clear statement of its policy in Palestine, particularly in regard to immigration and land questions. With regard to these two matters “the rights and position of non-Jewish communities in Palestine are to be fully safeguarded,” (2) that with regard to immigration, the number to be admitted should be defined, and that administrative machinery for the regulation or immigration should be reviewed, with the object of preventing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925-26; and also that pending the establishment of representative government the non-Jewish population or Palestine should be consulted on matters relating to immigration. Further, that there shouid be no further eviction of Arab cultivators from the land, pending the undertaking of a scientific inquiry by Government. To see how the land in Palestine could be

intensively cultivated, due regard should be taken to the certain natural increase in the present rural population. (3) That-some form of self-government should be instituted in Palestine.

As a result of this Shaw Commission his Majesty’s Government issued a White Paper, known as the Passfieid White Paper. In it they incorporated the recommendation of the Shaw Commission, curtailing immigration and land sales to Jews, and also creating a legislative council in which Jews and Arabs would have representation in proportion to their numbers.

The Jews attacked this White Paper severely in England and Palestine, in Parliament, the press, etc. The result was that the British Government, under the premiership of MacDonald, appointed a committee of Jews and British in England with a view to finding a means that would satisfy the Jews. It was decided, without officially canceling the White Paper, that it should not be effective, and to this end Sir Ramsay MacDonald addressed a letter to Dr. Weizman, which, to all intents and purposes, nullified the White Paper. It was called a letter explaining the White Paper, and it was officially published as a separate White Paper. The Jews were completely satisfied, and Dr. Weizman wrote in reply that the explanation was satisfactory. Not only this, but they sacked Lord Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, under whose signature the White Paper had appeared, although this White Paper had been published by the British Government as a whole, and with its unanimous approval. Sir John Chancellor, High Commissioner for Palestine, was also sacked, although his term of office had three years to run. Several high British Palestine Government officials were likewise removed, such as were not persona grata to Zionist leaders.

Nevertheless, His Majesty’s Government. thought they could not neglect to appoint, as suggested by the Shaw Commission, an expert scientific committee to inquire into the land problems of Palestine so they chose Sir John Hope

Simpson, a man of world fame and experience in matters of immigration and land settlement. After a prolonged inquiry in Palestine he produced a report known as the Hope Simpson report. Among other things he makes the following findings:

A. That although it is possible to encourage intensive agriculture, particularly mixed farming in certain parts of the country, this will not solve the land shortage that exists in Palestine.

B. That nearly 30% of the rural Arab population is completely landless, and that the remaining 70% have not among them all a sufficient average of land to support them.

At the time of these findings, it should be borne in mind, the Jews in Palestine were only 150,000 (now about 600,000 and the land then in their possession was much less than now, thus intensifying the point made by these findings.

Sir John further said that steps should be taken by the Government to prevent the increase of landless Arabs, and make up for the lack of land in Arab possession by intensive cultivation of those lands through financial aid by Government. He also said that any form of immigration on political grounds should be discouraged, and that labor immigration should only be allowed if local labor was unobtainable, etc. In fact this report vindicated the Arab case but brought upon him a deluge or Jewish criticism and abuse.

His Majesty’s Government had originally thought to implement the Hope Simpson recommendations and appoint him High Commissioner to execute these plans. (At the time the post of high Commissioner was vacant after the departure of Sir John Chancellor, who thereafter never received another post). However, on account oF Jewish pressure, this appointment was withheld, and the execution of his recommendations was never put into effect, but another commission was sent to make a repetition, with the same terms of reference as

the Hope Simpson Commission, hoping it would find a solution more favorable to the Jews. It is known as the French Commission.

The French Commission spent a much greater period in Palestine and produced a very detailed report known as the French Report. Its findings, far from reversing the Hope Simpson Report, if anything were more favorable in general to the Arab case. Regarding the landless Arabs, the report saddled upon the Government the responsibility of finding land for them at Government expense.

The 1934 Disturbances.

The last troubles, as above, were in 1929 from them resulted the series of inquiries that we have just discussed, in short as follows:-

1929, Shaw Commission Inquiry.

1930, Shaw Commission Report.

1930, Hope Simpson Report.

1932, French Report.

In 1932 Sir Arthur Wauchope was appointed high Commissioner, Who upon his arrival said that it was his purpose to increase cultivation, etc.

Thus, while every move of Government was thwarted by Zionist pressure on London, the ensuing reports of expert and disinterested commissions accentuated the Arab viewpoint. For this reason the Arabs remained quiet during these years, awaiting in some degree the fulfillment of their anticipation as foreshadowed by the findings of these reports.

Thus every British move to make a just inquiry into the Palestine question resulted in reports favorable to the Arab viewpoint; likewise each inquiry was countered by Zionist pressure on London; the results being that each report in turn was emasculated or killed by Zionists and Britishers sitting upon committees without the Arab viewpoint being heard. The results of the

inquiries above enumerated are two:

A. They kept the Arabs quiet from 1929-1934 awaiting the implementations of these findings or the Commissions.

B. While they have not altered the Arab high opinion of Great Britain, both as a nation and individually, they find His Majesty's Government absolutely under the thumb or Zionism, and prone to decide in the light of expediency rather than justice, when it comes to matters pertaining to Palestine.

Anyone who will take the time to read the various reports and White Papers issued by London, as above given, cannot help but see the justice of this reasoning.

To return to the immediate cause or these riots set against the background described above.

Before 1932 Jewish immigration had been suspended temporarily by the Government for some time, awaiting these reports. The Shaw Report stated, "The position is now acute – there is no alternative land to which persons (Arabs) evicted can remove – a landless and discontented class is being created – a potential cause of future disturbance." (page 142).

The Hope Simpson Report similarly states: "If all the cultivable land in Palestine (presumably including Jewish) were divided up among the Arab agricultural population, there would not be enough to provide every family with a decent living." Referring to Arab unemployment Sir John Hope Simpson further stated it to be "serious and widespread. … It is wrong that a Jew from Poland, Lithuania, or Yemen, should be admitted to fill an existing vacancy, while in Palestine there are already workmen capable of filling that vacancy who are unable to find employment." (See Peele Report, pages 71 and 72).

Rather than remedying the evils as set out in these recommendations, in 1932, 9,553 Jews were allowed to enter Palestine, (a large figure in comparison with

the past years). In 1933, 30,337 immigrants entered the country, and in 1934, 42,359. These figures only show those that entered legally, but it was common knowledge that illegal entries were practically as numerous as the legal. Indeed, in 1933 the high Commissioner openly declared that illegal immigration that year exceeded the legal.

During these last three years (1932-34) the Arabs did not cease but repeatedly asked to have the recommendations of the various commissions implemented, especially on the three major issues: immigration, land transfers and constitutional development. These demands to the Palestine authorities, to the British Government in London, and to the League of Nations in Geneva, were rejected. Not only were they turned down but the Arabs saw that in the meantime immigration, far from being curtailed, was increasing from year to year, as above shown, and land transfers to Jews were correspondingly greater; nor was there any sign of constitutional development in view.

The seriousness with which the Arabs view this purchase of land cannot be understood by anyone not familiar with its background, which is one which alienates it forever. Practically all farm land is bought by the Keren Kayemeth, a trust registered in London for the purchase of land as the inalienable property of the Jews of the world, for the settlement of Jews thereon, in the following countries: Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, hinting at the scope of ultimate Zionist aims. This document of trust was kept secret, and was only disclosed some ten years ago, when the question of tax upon its funds arose. The Jews claimed it to be a charitable trust, and not eligible to tax; however, this view was not sustained by Parliament. It is a known fact that the lands now belonging to the Jews are not only greater in proportion to their numbers than those of the Arabs, but also proportionately superior in quality, since most are on the coastal plain rather than predominantly mountain terraces.

To return, the Arabs found that they had exhausted all constitutional methods of airing and getting rid of their grievances, and decided in the autumn of 1934 to stage peaceful demonstrations .

once a week, each in a different city of Palestine, asking for the implementation of the recommendations of the various Commissions, and hoping thereby that the world at large would get to know the Arab grievances.

They warned Government beforehand that they were forced to this method, because Government had in the past always refused their demands, but they left the door open for negotiations and the cancelling of the demonstrations before they took place – but again Government was adamant, and would not give them mission to hold these demonstrations.

The Jerusalem Demonstration.

The Jerusalem demonstration took place on an appointed day without the consent of the Government. It was broken up by police by baton attacks and mounted charges. Many men and also women were wounded, but no one was killed.

Jaffa Demonstration.

The following week the demonstration staged for Jaffa took place at the appointed time. The plan was that the worshipers at the midday prayers on Friday, headed by the political leaders, should march from the Mosque to the Government Offices, just across the square, in a purely Arab portion of Jaffa, to lodge a formal protest by document with the Government, and again ask for the implementation of the recommendations of the various British commissions that London had sent out as picked experts on such matters.

Government, having made up its mind to prevent these demonstrations, had massed considerable police and military forces in and around Jaffa, and as soon as the procession emerged into the square they were called upon by the

police to disperse. The police had already established themselves in tactical positions, with a clear display of special arms. The procession proceeded, but was frontally challenged by baton attacks and mounted police charges. Although a number of Arabs were wounded in this first attack, and although no arms or any sort were in their possession, still they were able to push back the police and proceed a few paces forward.

The police, after their line had been broken, were given orders to fire at the procession. They did so and more than 26 persons were killed and 187 injured. In the melee 56 constables were wounded by the throwing of stones, pieces of small timbers from awnings, etc., and one Arab constable was killed by these methods. No daggers, firearms or lethal weapons were used. (Ed: As a result of this affray Mousa Hazim Pasna, who led the demonstration, received a shock and died some months later.)

Further demonstrations that had been scheduled for future weeks in other Arab towns were canceled by the Arab Executive, believing that what had happened was sufficient to call the attention of the world to the Arab case in Palestine, and also to prevent further bloodshed. Nevertheless the news of the Jaffa episode spread to other towns in Palestine, and clashes occurred between the Arabs and the police, when Government buildings were attacked and firearms were again used against them.

During these disturbances no Jew or Jewish property was attacked, molested or looted. In the three previous disturbances attacks were carefully limited to Jews – now the attacks were directed solely against the Government, because of their lack of faith in Government, which deliberately refused to do anything that their commissions had recommended.

Seeking to min back Arab confidence.

As a result of these disturbances, nothing was done in the way of commissions of inquiry. However, Sir Arthur Wauchope, then high Commissioner, sought to

win the lost confidence of the Arabs by a policy of reconciliation.

Sheikh Izzidin al Qassam.

In 1935 the various Arab political parties consolidated their ranks.

In October of that year a consignment of arms and ammunition was smuggled by the Jews in cement barrels through the harbor of Jaffa, again seriously arousing the fears of the Arabs. The Palestine atmosphere that had become calmed was quickly electrified with fear. The Arabs said, Not only are Britain bayonets forcing their Zionist policy upon us, but the Jews are now arming themselves in order that they may, by force of arms, establish their National home.” This secret arming made Arab blood run high.

In November, Sheikh Izzidin al Qassam, with a widespread reputation as a Moslem religious leader, toured north and central Palestine, from village to village, exhorting the people to secretly arm themselves against the Jewish invasion. Although the Jewish arms were known to have been imported by the Jewish Agency, no action was taken against any of them, while the Arab preacher and his disciples, within a fortnight were surrounded and killed. The funeral of this sheik was the occasion of perhaps the greatest Arab demonstration in Palestine history.

While aiming at brevity in enumerating tile successive Arab demonstrations, it is necessary to go into some detail concerning this Sheikh, and the repercussions his lire had upon Arabs in general and the later troubles in particular.

The Sheikh was a religious leader who had created a new Puritan sect based upon the adherence to the teachings or the Koran, plus (and this was a great innovation) cooperation with one’s fellow neighbors, with a complete disregard for money and temporal gain and possession. Through his religious teachings and influence he was enabled to organize the Arab labor movement

in the North, to better the housing conditions of the lowest and poorest classes of Arab laborers, and in general to help raise their standard of living, even though the labor body were not adherents to his religious sect. His movement was entirely independent of any political Arab organization, the Supreme Moslem Council, or even Hadj Amin, who, one might say, would resent any other person, particularly religious, gaining power. Up to this time he was not a political leader, nor in fact ever was he preached armed resistance to Jewish armed invasion on religious grounds; that Palestine was a sacred country to Islam, and that its protection was in the hand of its Arab people.

When surrounded by the police and called upon to surrender, though he could have saved his life, with but a minor charge facing him, he shouted that he had nothing to give his country but his life, and he willingly sacrificed it.

It is now known that anyone who became a member of his sect attained high moral impulses, so much so that in the revolution that took place from 1956 to 1969, wherever any of his followers were concerned the revolution was conducted on the highest possible standards for humanity and honesty or purpose. Unfortunately, the vast majority of his lieutenants were killed in 1936-37, and thereafter the standard of the revolution deteriorated from month to month. In the opinion of independent Arab students on these matters, if there is any one factor which may be regarded as the moving spirit of Arab youth toward sacrificing one’s life for his country, it is certainly the life and death of Sheikh Izzidin al Qassam early in November, 1935.

Arab Executive makes formal demands.

On the 25th of November, 1935, the Arab parties presented

Government with a formal demand for the following;

1. The establishment of a democratic government.

"2. The prohibition of transfer of Arab lands to Jews. 3. The immediate

cessation of Jewish Immigration pending the formation of a committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country, in accordance with the recommendations of the British"

Commissions of inquiry. The British Government at once said “no” to the second and third demands. With regard to the first, the High Commissioner was authorized, on December 21st, 1935, to submit to the Arabs and the Jews a scheme for the creation of a legislative body of Arabs and Jews. Although the proposals fell far short of the Arab conception of a constitutional Government, yet they accepted it. The Jews, however, rejected the proposition. In the House of Lords the proposal was discussed in February, 1936. All the Lords opposed the scheme, which was only supported by the Government spokesman, Lord Plymouth, Under-Secretary for the Colonies.

The following March of 1936 the scheme was discussed in the House of Commons; twelve members asked for its suspension, and two only, with the Secretary of State, favoured it. Therefore tits again was killed by Zionist pressure, causing extreme bitterness among trio Arabs, who had accepted trio orfer, and it proved once again that Zionist pressure was all-powerful. .Noticing trio bitterness thus created the British Government invited trio Arab leaders to go to London in order to discuss further possibilities. While this invitation was still pending the disturbances of 19:4 started.

With reference to these decisions of Parliament to kill the British Government’s proposals for creating a legislative council in Palestine, -I quote from trio Poole Report: “It is nonetheless unfortunate . the Jewish side of the case was so much more fully stated than the Arab. The debate indeed was a striking illustration of the disadvantage which the Arabs airfe++r often the field of controversy shifts from Palestine to the United Kingdom. The Jews are perfectly entitled to make use of all the opportunities at their command for ensuring that their claims are fully understood; but we believe that their own

ultimate interests would have been better served if British public opinion could have been confronted from the outset liltn a no less clear and cogent statement of trio Arab case.”

God annihilated them – they . liel Britain would never do such a dirty trick.

it as l a +++great Jewish victory’. And that i* how the Arabs looked at it. They-were bound to think of it as even more conclusive evidence of Jewish power in London than the “Black Letter”. The scheme, Which in their eyes, went only a little way to concede the rights they claimed, had been adopted by the High Commissioner and endorsed by the British Government, only to be rejected by Jewish influence in Parliament. Inevitably their old hostility “t7) .-fire Mandate an -ail it stood for was reinforced. More than that, their old fear that trio Mandate might ultimately lead to their subjection to the Jews became more concrete and more urgent. They were really to be ‘swamped’ it seemed, and that in no long time. (Shaw Commission Report, pages 91-92).”

The 1936 Disturbances.

We have seen that trio two 1934 demonstrations in Jerusalem and Jaffa intended to be a peaceful airing or their grievances, ended in disturbances through clumsy Government action. It will be remembered that among other reasons for these demonstrations was the acute question of trio rapid rise of immigration, both legal and illegal.

After this, the Government took no notice of the state of high tension, and nothing was done to mitigate it. In fact the reverse was true, and instead of taking a course to curtail the legal and stop illegal immigration, the legal numbers rose from 42,000 in 1934, to 62,000 in 19;55, and 65,000 in 1936. The illegal showed practically double the number. Thus in proportion the resentment of the natives grew. The steps of the ladder’ that led up to this high pitch of feeling have been gone into, but here they can be enumerated in a condensed form:

A. Growth of legal and illegal immigration.

B. Increase of land sales to Jews.

C. Smuggling of automatic weapons, disclosing the arming of Jews on a large scale.

D. The patriotic sacrifice of Sheikh Izzidin al Qassam.

E. Rejection by Government of two or the three Arab demands, viz, curtailment of immigration and land sales.

F. The legislative body proposed by His Majesty’s

Government, accepted by the Arabs and killed by Zionism.

Thus the position in Palestine in the early spring of 1936 was electric, and only a spark was needed to set it off. This spark was an incident that occurred on April 15 of that year, as before narrated, but I shall now quote verbatim from the Peele Report, page 96:

The Course of the Disturbances.

The trouble began by the murder of two Jews by Arab bandits on the night or 15th April, on the Tulkarm-Nablus road. The following night two Arabs were murdered not far from Petah-Tiqva (Ed: Jewish colony), as an act – so the Arabs believe – of Jewishreprisal. The funeral of one of the murth:red Jews in Tel-Aviv, on the 17th April, led to angry Jewish demonstrations. A series of assaults on Arabs in Tel-Aviv began, and on the 19th April, excited by false rumours that Arabs had been killed, Arab mobs In Jaffa began attacking Jews, and murdered three of them.

(Editor’s note: While Tel-Aviv has grown up to Jaffa, so that there are no more two cities, each community lives practically separate from the other. Still, the main road from Jaffa to Tulkarm-Nablus on the north, leads through Tel-Aviv. Therefore Arabs are compelled by necessity to pass through the Jewish city.)

We have before dealt with the circumstances that followed, i.e. the ‘calling of a strike that culminated in a rebellion, in which Iraqi officers led the Arab bands; therefore there is no need to repeat, except to state that from local commissions (Palin 1920, and h eyeraft 1921) Parliamentary Commission (Shaw Commission, 1929) expert commissions (Hope Simpson, 1930, Lewis French, 1931) now the British Government appointed the highest type of inquiry, i.e. a Royal Commission (known as the Peele Commission, from whose report we have quoted.) This Commission’s report decided that the only solution was to divide Palestine into three zones:

A. A Jewish state, i.e. a strip coastal plain from south Jaffa to about Megiddo (here, true, the Jews then predominated) then north and east, taking in all Galilee, where for the sake of c few Jewish settlements the hundreds of Arab cities, towns and villages would come under Jewish statehood.

B. A British Mandate over a strip from Jaffa eastwards, to and including Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a vague suggestion ++or British control over Christian Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee, sacred to Christians. Strangely, Jaffa itself was to be a part of the Arab state, but wedged in between two parts of the Jewish state and the British Mandate, and still to be an open port to all three governments.

C. The remaining less fertile mountain districts and the desert to the south, cut apart, these two zones were to be the Arab share of Palestine, and by reason of its dearth of land was to be attached to Trans-Jordan. This decision was based upon the illogical assumption that the Jews of Poland or Lithuania had equal rights to Palestine with the Arabs, who descend from the peoples that inhabited Canaan before the Israelitish invasion under Joshua. .It is noteworthy that the ancient Hebrew kingdom never was able to hold all Palestine, and that even in the heights of its prosperity and Solomonic glory, the richer coastal plain was owned and dominated by its more powerful

neighbors. Now the case was to be reversed, and the Jews were to own that which historically they never possessed. Editor).

The Peele report was followed by official declarations by the British Government stating that they intended to implement all the recommendations of the Peel° Report, and a demarcation commission would be sent to fix boundaries.

The 1937 Disturbances. The Peele Report recommending partition was a. great shock to the Arabs. They saw for the first time that what before was a fear of Jewish domination had now become a reality, and that the best part of their country, after the mincing, was to go to the Jewish kingdom. If in the past the Arabs had doubted the assertion of the British that Arab rights would be protected, those doubts were now confirmed. The ensuing bitterness led to despair, and they asked themselves why they had stopped the revolution of 1936, – it should have continued.

Another factor that increased the tension was this. That. part of Galilee still predominantly Arab land – and the only good land left in their hands – was the stamping ground of Hadj Izzidin Qassam, and was by this division to become a part of the Jewish state. The Qassam following, after the death of their leader, became more ardent in their purpose, and now lost no time in warning the Arabs of this district of their impending fate.

The position therefore was charged, and only required a spark to ignite it. That spark developed on October 1, 1937, when the Government dissolved the Arab Higher Committee, declaring it an illegal organization. Government arrested all its members who were then in Palestine, and deported them to the Seychelles, deposing Hadj Amin from the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council and the Awqaf Committees, taking over the administration of the Supreme Moslem Council and its funds. The Mufti was also wanted, but as he resided in the precincts of the Noble Sanctuary (El Aqsa Mosque) was not

seized. The reason for this was that the Government knew that it would mean bloodshed, and bloodshed in the sacred precincts would cause resentment throughout the Moslem world, the full extent of which could not be calculated. Active steps were also taken to put into concentration camps hundreds of young Arabs who they thought might be dangerous. From now on a state of rebellion existed throughout Palestine, that did not end until the beginning of World War II.

In the meantime (about Oct. 10, 1937) Hadj Amin fled Palestine and took refuge in Lebanon, where he remained until the outbreak of war, when he again fled to Iraq.

The Palestine Partition Commission.

During this rebellion (it being known that the primary cause was the Peele Report) a commission was sent by the British Government, commonly known as the Palestine Partition Commission, to scientifically study and investigate the possibility of partition, as suggested by the Peele Commission. (Editor’s note:

The demarcation commission, as above promised, seems to have been shelved in favor of this Partition Commission). Its conclusions were that partition was not possible or practicable on economic, administrative or other grounds. Government thereupon issued another White Paper going back upon its previous decision for partition. But in spite of this reversion of programme, the rebellion continued, because of the lack of faith in British seesaw policy.

Again, in the late autumn of 1938, while the rebellion was still on, an invitation was issued to the Arabs of Palestine and of the neighboring Arab countries: Egypt, Iraq, wrans-Jordan, Hejaz and Yemen, to discuss the Palestine problem. At the same time. A similar invitation was tendered to the Jewish Agency for a conference.

These conferences were held in London independently, and lasted till d)out the end of March, 1939, terminating in failure to reach an acceptable solution to either party. Thereupon the Government issued another White Paper in 1939, in which it said that in spite of the refusal of both parties, the Government had decided to implement this White Paper. This covered three major matters, which were in short –

A. Drastic curtailment of land sales to Jews.

B. Stoppage of immigration after the entry of 75,000 Jews over a period of five years.

C. The creation by stages of a national representative Government in Palestine, composed of two-thirds Arabs and one-third Jews, to be completed within a specified number of years, and at the end of ten years to be in a position to attain full freedom and enter into treaty relations with Great Britain.

This White Paper was issued in May, 1939, and a number of negotiations (Arab and British) preceded and followed it, and in 1940 it was finally agreed by the Arabs and the representatives of the British Government that this White Paper should be at once implemented, and that immediate steps should be taken for the creation of the Palestine autonomous government as adumbrated by it

Conclusion. None of these arrangements have been put through, and the White Paper is still shelved. At present, while the Arabs are waiting for the Government to execute its terms, the Jews are pressing Britain directly, and indirectly through America, to have this White Paper repealed. They threaten the Allies that they are strong enough, from a military point of view, to face the world with a fait accompli and bring into Palestine a million illegal Immigrants within every short period, to be counted in months, thereby becoming a majority in the country and dictating their terms. The Jews also say that nothing now prevents them from fulfilling their plans except the fact

that the countries from which those illegal immigrants are to be brought are In German hands, and as soon as the Germans are cleared out, mass immigration into ‘Palestine will start, regardless of whether the war has come to an end or not. It is generally expected that such mass immigration will start immediately upon the successful invasion of the Balkans by the Allies.

The British feel the danger of this mass immigration, and at the same time they make it clear that they are unable to turn immigrants back once they have reached Palestine. It is thought that the best way to prevent it would be to anticipate and thwart It at the point of starting. Yet it is admitted, particularly in connection with the Balkan countries, such interference by Britain would be negligible.

The Arabs, on the other hand, reel that illegal immigration can be stopped by Britain if she really puts her will into the ffffffbetter, for the following reasons:

A. She is the mistress of the seas, and with her are allies also powerful on the sea. Therefore no one can convince them that private institutions like the Jewish agency can, with impunity, challenge this mastery of the seas.

B. That either during the war, or after it, illegal immigration can successfully be prevented by military or diplomatic means, if Britain were really determined to stop it.

C.That at any rate, Britain has full control in Palestine, and If she were sincere in her declarations about stopping immigration, as stated in that White Paper of 1939, she would prevent such illegal entry.

D. That Britain knows that the Jewish Agency is behind this policy of illegal immigration, and if Government would only take as firm a stand vis-a-vis the Agency as they have against the Arabs, the Jewish scheme would fail. (Editor: The inference is that the Arab Higher Committee was dissolved as an illegal body, and that now here is the Jewish Agency, known by Government to be

aiding illegal immigration, smuggling arms and training an army).

In connection with that mentioned above about the Jews feeling themselves strong enough from a military point of view, the Arabs are not uninformed as to the clandestine arming of Jews on a very large scale. The fact that the Jews put much pressure on Great Britain to allow them to form a Jewish army to fight under a Jewish flag, and when this failed they used every method, both legal and illegal, to push every possible young man into the Allied armies, has not blinded the Arabs to the true motive behind this false patriotism. From Jewish utterances we kn that they are not fighting for the Allies or for the ideal or democracy; rather they are thereby training their youth for military duty, in order to fight for Zionism, if need be against the British, when the time comes. Not only this, but they have in Palestine secret military organizations where they train the youth, from 15 years of age, in the art of war on Nazi principles on a very large scale. Many youth outtings have resulted in deaths from explosions of bombs they carry, hut reported as accidentally coming in contact with mines. These facts are well known to the British military and civil authorities in Palestine. In this connection it is a well known fact that during World War I, while the Jews were negotiating with Great Britain for a National Home in Palestine, they were at the same time dickering with the Germans for the same purpose, and actually received promises of meeting their demands. However, England forestalled this by making a more elastic promise – the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917,—OFTF Lord Allenby v s armies occupying Palestine (see Peels Report, page 23).

Briefly, the present Palestine position is as follows:-

I. The ‘White Paper issued in May, 1939, which Great Britain said was her final and decisive policy as to Palestine, and which would be implemented, regardless of whether either or both parties accepted it or not.

2. This White Paper (now practically five years old) has not been implemented

in any manner in connection with constitutional or representative changes in the Government. The clauses regarding the curtailment of land transfer to the Jews cannot be deemed to nave been carried out by the half-hearted measures taken by the Government in this respect. With regard to immigration, the maximum figure of 75,000 within five years given in the White Paper, has, according to Jewish statistics (illegal immigration) been exceeded long ago, while according to Government figures this has not been reached owing to the war and the occupation of Europe by Germany.

3. While the Arabs are patiently waiting for Great Britain to honour her pledge and fulfill the terms of the White paper, the Jews are determined to have it repealed, either by political pressure, as in the plat, or by force of arms. Regarding America, the Arabs believe that the official view of the American Government favors Zionism, and neglects the Arabs and their rights. They would like to believe that this is due to their lack of information re Zionist aspirations and Arab rights, but they feel that America is one of the few countries in the world which has all the opportunities – its foreign service, its missionaries, educational and other philanthropic institutions, travellers and students of world affairs, scores of thousands or Arabs living in America and enjoying American citizenship – to learn the true facts of the situation. If, in spite of all that, the official view is, as the Arabs believe it to be, pro-Zionist, then the Arabs feel they are justified in assuming that such views are held by the official k:A.ies, either owing to Zionist propaganda or because such officials indifferent to the cause of justice in Palestine.

The Arab impression has come about in the following way:-

A. By repeated utterances by the President and a host of American politicians and statesmen, both before and during the war, favoring Zionism with all its implications, and not ever taking into consideration or even making any mention of Arab preponderance rights to Palestine.

B. The 1939 Arab delegation to the London conference was offered a solution or the Palestine problem more favorable to them than the terms or the White Paper that was subsequently published. The orfer, while still under discussion, was withdrawn by the Britain Government, and tne delegation WWI told that the witndrayil++l was made because the United States Government had intervS4*ed and asked the British Government not to go so far in deference to the Jews.

This was told the joint Arab Delegation by the then Prime Minister, the late Mr. Chamberlain, ilielarnce ++of Lord d alXifax, the Foreign Secretary, and MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary. They were further told that while as yet America was not an ally, still the world was on the verge of another World War, and England could not therefore neglect the wishes of her friends.

Thereupon a part of the Arab Delegation called on the United States Ambassador in London, Mr. Kennedy, who denied having made any advances to the British on that score. The Arabs thereupon faced the British Government with this reply, only to be told that the pressure had come direct from Washington, through the British Ambassador there.

Unofficially it was explained by some members of the British Government that the President was on the threshold of another term of office. Therefore he was anxious for the American Jewish vote and influence, which was considerable.

The Stopping of the 1937-1939 Rebellion.

While all this was going on, the World War II started, and the Arabs were still in open revolt against the British. The Arab leaders, nevertheless, after having discussed the matter with representatives of the Arab States and other Arab leaders, decided to stop the rebellion in Palestine on account of the war, in which England was deeply involved. One of the major reasons why they came to this conclusion was to prove to the world that their rebellion was not inspired by foreign anti-British influence, but was a natural act of self-

preservation and self-defence against Zionist invasion. The Arabs had no quarrel with the British as such. Their only grievance was the blind British support of Zionist aggression, which repeatedly, under Jewish pressure, nullified the findings or their own experts.

CHAPTER III. Conclusions.

Chapter I was devoted to Hadj Amin’s life and background, and his activities after coming into power.

Chapter II, while going over much of the ground of Chapter I, was intended as a list of –

A. Arab disturbances and revolutions, and their causes.

B. The British Commissions of experts sent to Palestine to investigate the Arab unrest.

In each case Arab contentions as to the cause of their grievances were proved to be well founded, and in each case Zionist political pressure was brought to bear in order to emasculate the report favourable to the Arabs. In no case were the findings of the Commissions proved erroneous, but rather that they did not fit in with the Zionist programme.

The only exception to the above was the Peele Commission Report, recommending the partition of Palestine. This was obnoxious to the Arabs, and was clearly intended as a solution to please the Jews and thereby fulfil the Balfour Declaration, according to the Zionist interpretation – an elastic promise which every thinking Britisher must realise was a mistake and not just.

Not only did the Peale Report rile the Arabs, nor did it measure up to the exaggerated aims of the Zionists, but more importantly still, the succeeding commissions that arrived from London to Implement the report, found it quite unworkable and impractical.

With this background in mind let us go back to our original theme, that of Hadj Amin l s personality. Hadj Amin became the head of three important bodies – positions quite incompatible with each other. To this fact his worst failures were probably due.

1st, as Grand Mufti. He was elected by vote to this esteemed post, but only through British intervention and backing, as earlier narrated, and thereby became the Moslem religious leader of Palestine.

2nd, as Head of the Supreme Moslem Council. This Council had the following powers:

A. To supervise the Sharia Courts, in which all cases pertaining to Moslem law are tried and settled, e.g. marriage, divorce and inheritance, etc.

B. To administer the “Awqaf”, i.e. entailed property such as mosques, charities and family properties.

(Ed; Awqaf is divided into two categories: “Eaatry” ++or Religious i.e. mosques, charitable institutions and property devoted to their support; “Zurri” (descendants or seed), property so tied up that it cannot be sold, Which is administered by or at least under the supervision or the Awqaf. All income is divided among the heirs of the donor in perpetuity). Hadj Amin received half his yearly salary of LP 1200 direct from Government (Sharia Courts) and half from the Awqaf. 3rd, as Political Leader. This imposed and accepted role led to and ended in his becoming anti-Government. Hadj Amin’s greatest opportunities lay in the office of Mufti. he used these opportunities for education, culture, and social and religious upleft as well, but only to a limited extent – they ended in politics.

Prior to his entering politics he was called R1 Muslih el akbar “The Great Reformer” even ranking higher than the middle nineteenth century Sheikh, Afghani, and his mil, Sheikh Whammed Abdo, of Egypt.

In his capacity as chief of the Supreme Moslem Council he supervised and administered the Shari& ++Courts and the Auger. These Courts come under the Palestine judicial system – all salaries are met by the Government and all revenue paid into the Government treasury. In point of fact the administration of these Religious Courts is in the hands of the Supreme Moslem Council. Hadj Amin improved standards and cut out bribery. These Courts, under him, functioned satisfactorily.

With regard to the Awqaf the position was different. In the affairs of the Wegt ++Haramy he did well, and in the upkeep of mosques and other religious institutions. (Ed: It was through his seal – over-seal as archaeologists see it – that the collecting of funds was started for the entire rebulleing of the Moscato R1 Agee). But when it came to matters of Waqf Zurri, he interfered too much and thereby created formidable opposition. This developed into or rather was the means of the growth of the Hashashibi “Ll Difa l a” or “Defence” party.

The general criticism of the Awqaf and the Shari* Courts under nadj Ambit s presidency is such as is normal to find hurled against any eboted+++ body. He and his group were originally elected, as we have seen above, in 1921. Upon thes (mond election air. 1926-7, because of a flaw in the elections, the civil Alin Court declared tam nul+ and void. However, the Government reinstated him and his majority, and since then there have been no elections. The criticism was that appointments made by the Mufti all fell to those of his party and his friends, rather than to merit. This was true. His defense was, “how can I work with enemies? I must have around ma those I can trust.”

nis opponents believed, and still believe that there was or is not a big enough Zionist figure to buy him. In lesser matters, when it came to ;arsenal gain, he was honest. Money meant little to him. On the other hand, when it came to money being a vehicle to power and prestige, he was not blameless.

As examples –

Orphan funds. The Sharia Courts used to appoint guardians of orphan estates. Instead of these many individuals, the

Mufti created a central body to handle all orphan estates, and placed this body under the &Maria Courts. Thus he placed in his power sums representing hundreds of thousands of pounds. Investments were made under his dominating presidency not with a view to their security and income to the orphans (loans were made to insolvent creditors), but were rather directed by political expediency, viz., such as would bring him more prestige and power. Thus Hadj Amin lost confidence with randly circles that were adversely affected. In this lenning of maqf funds he, to his mind, balanced the effect of political weight, and gave or withheld as circumstances dictated.

Collection of funds for the repair of the Mosque B1 Ave. From all over the Moslem world Hadj Amin succeeded in collecting vast sums. In spending these thousands and thousands of pounds he had a wide opportunity of exercising his nepotism, he created many unnecessary jobs, thereby in reality hiring men to forward his political ends. (91: PoseLbly he learned from American politicians or Union Labour leaders.)

Personality. By strength of personality he overawed all those under ass, both in the Olaf and the Maria Courts, so that they furthered his ambitions for political grandeur. The result was that by 1930 he came to be looked upon as Palestine’s only possible savior from Zionism. The above acts all fall within the category of his being head of the Supreme Moslem Council – as Mufti he could have exercised no such posers. Disappearance from Palestine.

We do not need to enlarge upon the history of Hadj AmLn’s departure from Palestine. It is known that after fleeing Palestine+ hefiret resided in Beirut. Upon the Allied occupation of Syria he moved to Baghdad, and again when the Iraqi uprising was crashed and the country occupied by the Allies, he fled to

Tehran. After the Allied occupation or Persia, we hoer of him in Axis countries, both Italy and Germany. Dhile in Beirut Hadj Amin was under French guards, but with the knowledge of the French Authorities he reorganized the Arab Higher Committee with former members available there at the time. Their activities were purely political, and never dealt with violence. The Committee was allowed to meet with Hadj Amin on specific days.

During this time it was known that the Palestine revolution was being backed and supported by a secret organization of Palestinians and Syrians functioning from Damascus. This organization furnished and supported the revolution with arms and ammunition, clothing, food and money. The organization was 80 secret that I do not know till today who they were. (Asked which of the following reports were true – (a) that Hadj Amin ordered the murder of many Arabs during the revolution because they were his political enemies; or (b) that the situation got out of hand, and under the guise of following the instructions of those higher up, many of the revolutionists took the opportunity to bump off personal enemies, or of being paid to CIO so by others, our informant replied as follows):

I lost touch with Hadj Amin l s doings after he left Palestine. I know that ++as langas the Kasim lieutenants and disciples were in poser+ the revolution was run on a very high plane of justice, but as these were one by one killed off, more and more the ranks of the revolution were swelled by regular brigands. The position deteriorated until the revolution was finally called off.

Miter: In this connection, to one of Hadj Amin’s closest friends and a great admirer – now an important official in the Palestine Government – was put this question: Did Hadj Amin get funds from the Axis to help run the revolution? The reply was, “I know that we Arabs were all called upon to contribute to the fund, and the amounts we were assigned were not small, no that great funds were thus collected. I also know that non-Palestinian Arabs helped meet the

cost of the revolution. Whether Hadj Amin was offered or accepted funds from the Axis I am not in a position to know, but I should not censure him if he did. We could not any longer hope for any help or justice from Great Britain. We Arabs are net anti-British or anti-American. We lookup to them as great nations, with high ideals of justice – the loaders in democracy. But when it comes to Palestine we cannot trust or respect them. They are under the thumb and controlled, for various reasons, by the Jews and Zionists.")

Jerusalem,

22nd October, 1943.

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